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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROVO CITY, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee 
vs. 
MIGUEL DAVID GEDO 
Defendant / Appellant 
CaseNo.20050086-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH 
COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT, FROM A CONVICTION OF 
DISORDERLY CONDUCT, AN INFRACTION, INTERFERENCE WITH 
ARRESTING OFFICER, A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR, AND RECKLESS 
DRIVING, A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR, BEFORE THE HONORABLE 
SAMUEL MCVEY. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Miguel Gedo's Motion to 
Dismiss/Suppress and found that the issue regarding the search of the vehicle for the 
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vehicle identification number was irrelevant at that time, the towing of the Gedos' vehicle 
was justified, and thus, no evidence should be suppressed nor the case dismissed. 
Standard of Review. "A trial court's findings of fact underlying its decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress must be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. 
However, [an appellate court] review[s] the trial court's legal conclusions in regards 
thereto under a correction of error standard." State v. Wagstaff 846 P.2d 1311,1312 
(Utah App. 1993). 
2. Whether the trial court erred when it ruled that Miguel1 was not justified in 
using force to prevent the towing of his vehicle when there were alternative legal means 
that satisfied the requirements of due process. 
Standard of Review. "[I]n cases involving mixed questions of fact and law where 
the judge makes a determination on contested facts, [an appellate court] view[s] the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and reverse[s] only if the 
necessary factual findings implicit in the court's ruling lack sufficient evidentiary 
support." State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1991). 
3. Whether the trial court erred when it did not find any selective prosecution on 
the basis of the Gedos' race nor any evidence of overall discrimination against Latinos by 
the Provo City police. 
because the appeals for Miguel and James Gedo are closely related and share transcripts, 
this brief will refer to the Appellant as Miguel and to his brother, the Appellant in 20050087-CA, 
as James in order to avoid confusion. 
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Standard of Review. "[I]n cases involving mixed questions of fact and law where 
the judge makes a determination on contested facts, [an appellate court] view[s] the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and reverse[s] only if the 
necessary factual findings implicit in the court's ruling lack sufficient evidentiary 
support." Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-9-102(l)(b), (3) Disorderly Conduct 
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if: 
(a) he refuses to comply with the lawful order of the police to move from 
a public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous or physically offensive 
condition, by any act which serves no legitimate purpose; or 
(b) intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or 
recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: 
(i) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening 
behavior; 
(ii) makes unreasonable noises in a public place; 
(hi) makes unreasonable noises in a private place which can be heard 
in a public place; or 
(iv) obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. 
* * * 
(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the offense continues after 
a request by a person to desist. Otherwise it is an infraction. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 Interfering with Arresting Officer 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and 
interferes with the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
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(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful 
order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from 
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
Utah Code Ann, § 41-6-45 (2003) Reckless Driving 
(1) A person is guilty of reckless driving who operates a vehicle: 
(a) in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property; or 
(b) while committing three or more moving traffic violations under Title 
41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, in a series of acts within a 
single continuous period of driving. 
(2) A person who violates Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Miguel was charged by information filed in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
charging that on or about March 5, 2003, Miguel David Gedo committed the crimes of 
Criminal Mischief, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
106([2])(c),(d); Disorderly Conduct, a Class C Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-9-102; Interference with Arresting Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305; and Reckless Driving, a Class B Misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-45 [(2003)]. (R. at 0001-0003). 
On April 21, 2003, an arraignment was held before Judge Guy R. Burningham. 
Miguel entered a not guilty plea for each charge filed, obtained an Affidavit of Indigency, 
and signed a promise to appear for pretrial conference on May 20, 2003. (R. at 0013-
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0014). On May 20,2003, Miguel was found indigent by the Court and Laura Cabanilla 
was appointed to represent Miguel. (R. at 0015, 0019). The matter was continued for a 
pretrial conference on July 3, 2003. (R. at 0019, 0021-0022). When Miguel failed to 
appear for the July 3, 2003, pretrial conference, a bench warrant was issued. (R. at 0028-
0031). On August 5, 2003, Miguel appeared before Judge Gary D. Stott regarding the 
warrant, and the matter was set for a pretrial conference on August 12, 2003. 
On August 12, 2003, Miguel appeared before Judge Guy R. Burningham 
regarding the return on the bench warrant. At the same hearing, Scott Card was 
appointed as Miguel's public defender, and the matter was set for a pretrial conference on 
September 25, 2003. (R. at 0035, 0039). While the record does not contain a Notice of 
Withdrawal or Order of Withdrawal for Laura Cabanilla, apparently, she had previously 
withdrawn with court permission "when she could not locate [Miguel] as he was traveling 
from the country at that time." (R. at 0071). On September 25, 2003; November 18, 
2003; and December 18, 2003, the matter was continued, with the last continuance setting 
a new pretrial conference on February 12, 2004. (R. at 0058, 0063, 0067). On February 
12, 2004, Judge Anthony W. Schofield granted Scott Card's motion to withdraw, 
reappointed Laura Cabanilla to represent Miguel, and set the matter for a pretrial 
conference on February 24, 2004. (R. at 0072-0076). 
On February 24, 2004, the matter was again continued with a new pretrial 
conference set for April 6, 2004. (R. at 0085). On April 6, 2004, the matter was 
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continued until June 7, 2004. (R. at 0087-0088). On June 7, 2004, after Judge Samuel 
McVey denied the Motion for a Bill of Particulars filed by Miguel's counsel, the matter 
was set for a final pretrial conference on August 26, 2004 and a jury trial on September 
14, 2004. (R. at 0092-0093). On August 26,2004, Miguel's counsel moved to join this 
case with James Gedo's case (also currently on appeal under case number 20050087-CA), 
the September 14, 2004, jury trial was stricken, a final pretrial conference and law and 
motion hearing was set for September 20, 2004, and the jury trial was set for November 
23 and 24, 2004. (R. at 0104-0105). On September 20, 2004, Judge McVey denied the 
Motion to Dismiss on the criminal mischief charge filed by Miguel's counsel. (R. at 
0111-0112). On November 9, 2004, Miguel's counsel filed a Motion to 
Dismiss/Suppress arguing the same issues argued on this appeal. (R. at 0115-0129). The 
motion was set for hearing on December 2, 2004. (R. at 0131). 
On December 2, 2004, Judge McVey denied the Motion to Dismiss/Suppress. 
(R. at 0142-0144). At that hearing, Miguel's counsel argued, either orally or by reference 
to the motion, that Cadet Trotter's search for the vehicle identification number (VIN) was 
illegal, the towing of the Gedos' vehicle was not authorized by Utah law, (T.0261:49 at 
13-25), Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-401 and 76-2-406 justified the use offeree in defense of 
the Gedos' property, (T.0261:57 at 5-13), and the numerous charges against and police 
incidents involving Miguel and James as well as some comments by police and a 
prosecutor indicated that Miguel and James had been selectively prosecuted. 
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(T.0261:61at 2-11). Provo City responded, either orally or through its Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss/Supress, that nothing was "discovered or 
seized that [was] being used as evidence in this case" from the VIN Search, (R. at 0135), 
Provo City Code § 9.17.080 authorized the towing of the vehicle for four or more unpaid 
parking tickets, (T.0261:64 at 19-23), Miguel was not authorized to use force where there 
was no criminal interference with his property, (T.0261:65 at 9-22), and Miguel failed to 
show that he was "treated disparately under the law as written or applied" due to his race. 
(T.0261:66 at 4-8). Judge McVey declined to rule on the issue regarding the search of the 
vehicle for the VIN, reserving the right to reconsider "if it turns out that the VIN, is . . . 
critical to the prosecution in the future." (T.0261:71 at 3-11). Judge McVey also found 
the towing of the vehicle justified, and that "any forcible defense of the property was not 
justified," and Judge McVey did "not find any selective prosecution on the basis of racial 
category . . . nor any evidence of overall discrimination against Latinos by the Provo City 
Police." (T.0261:79 at 14-25). 
A jury trial was held on December 8 and 9, 2004, before Judge Samuel 
McVey. (R. at 0145-0147). Miguel was found not guilty of Criminal Mischief, a class B 
misdemeanor; not guilty of Disorderly Conduct, a class C misdemeanor; guilty of 
Disorderly Conduct, an infraction; guilty of Interfering with an Arresting Officer, a class 
B misdemeanor; and guilty of Reckless Driving, a class B misdemeanor (R. at 0149-
0153). On January 20, 2005, Miguel was sentenced to the statutory maximum for both 
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Class B Misdemeanors, with all but twenty-one (21) days of jail suspended. (R. at 0157-
0159). On January 25, 2005, defendant filed a timely appeal. (R. at 0212). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The circumstances surrounding the incident leading to the charges against 
Miguel and James were as follows:2 In the morning of March 5, 2003, Provo City Parking 
Cadet Linda Trotter was checking vehicles on 450 West in Provo City for expired 
registrations and improper parking. (T.0261:18 at 17-19). Cadet Trotter noticed a red 
and gray GMC Suburban with Utah plate 148ZRG that was "long over expired" parked in 
front of an apartment complex at 1741 North 450 West. (T.026L18 at 22-25). After 
Cadet Trotter entered the number of the plate into her computer to write a ticket for the 
infraction (T.0261:19 at 19-21), information on her computer from Provo City's 
collections department indicated that the vehicle was to be towed for four or more unpaid 
2The circumstances surrounding the incident leading to the charges against Miguel 
were presented in testimony during a hearing on December 2, 2004, and during his jury 
trial on December 8 and 9, 2004. However, over concern of the cost of extensive 
transcripts, Gedos5 counsel and Provo City agreed to limit the transcripts to various 
pertinent hearings and only one testimony, that of Officer Phillip Webber, from the jury 
trial. (R. at 0204; 20050087-CA R. at 0254-0256). Nevertheless, the testimony offered 
by Cadet Trotter during the December 2, 2004, motions hearing and the testimony of 
Officer Webber from the trial are mostly sufficient to illustrate Provo City's version of 
the events. For the remaining facts, Provo City, as specifically indicated below, stipulates 
to some of the other facts indicated in Miguel's brief. The record, however, does not 
contain the testimony of Miguel and James regarding their version of the events that took 
place on March 5, 2003. Nevertheless, the Statement of Relevant Facts in Miguel's 
appellate brief adequately describes the Gedos' version of the events. Provo City does 
not contest that the Gedos made the statements claimed in Miguel's Statement of 
Relevant Facts, but Provo City does not agree that the statements provide a true and 
correct description of what occurred on March 5, 2003. 
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parking tickets. (T.0261:20 at 5-16). Cadet Trotter then called the Provo City collections 
department and verified the four unpaid parking tickets. (T.0261:21 at 2-7). Cadet 
Trotter contacted dispatch and had them run the plate, but the dispatcher said that the 
plate was not on file, which did not surprise Cadet Trotter "with a date that old." 
(T.0261:21 at 9-10, 15-20). 
Cadet Trotter also contacted the tow company to tow the vehicle. (T.0261:21 
at 10-11, 22-23). When the information on her computer indicated the plate belonged 
with a different car, Cadet Trotter decided to do a VIN search on the GMC. (T.0261:22 
at 2-7). The VIN in the window was covered with debris and paper, and Cadet Trotter 
was unable to locate the number underneath the GMC. (T.0261:22 at 9-14). When the 
tow truck arrived, Cadet Trotter asked the tow truck driver to open the GMC's door, so 
she could get the VIN. (T.0261:22 at 11-14). The driver opened the door and Cadet 
Trotter obtained the VIN, which registered to a Kenneth Parker of American Fork, Utah. 
(Aplt. Brf. at 6). 
When the tow truck arrived, Cadet Trotter moved her vehicle across the street 
and to the south about half a house from the GMC. (T.0261:22-23 at 24-25, 1-7). The 
tow truck driver proceeded to back in to put the truck's hooks underneath the GMC. 
(T.0261:23 at 11-12). Cadet Trotter then noticed that a man had approached the truck 
driver and was speaking with the tow truck driver, but Cadet Trotter was unable to hear 
their conversation. (T.0261:23 at 18-22). Cadet Trotter did hear that man yell over his 
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shoulder something to the effect of, "you're not going to steal my car," as he was going 
back into his house. (T.0261:24 at 13-15). 
That individual then reentered the house and both individuals then exited. 
(Aplt. Brf. at 8). Miguel apparently then entered the GMC and attempted to start it. 
(Aplt. Brf. at 8). Cadet Trotter felt the tow truck driver needed assistance and drove up 
and stopped parallel to the GMC. (Aplt. Brf. at 8). Cadet Trotter testified, with some 
contrary testimony by Miguel, that Miguel opened his car door into Cadet Trotter's jeep 
with such force and violence that Miguel created a dent and three deep scratches to her 
vehicle. (Aplt. Brf. at 8). Cadet Trotter further testified that Miguel was then able to start 
the GMC with the assistance of James and drove the GMC off of the tow truck lift, and 
the GMC was parked in the Gedos' driveway. (Aplt. Brf. at 9). 
Cadet Trotter testified that she drove into the driveway, parking behind the 
GMC with her jeep in an effort to prevent the Suburban from being driven away. (Aplt. 
Brf. at 9). Cadet Trotter testified that James approached her vehicle and screamed at her. 
(Aplt. Brf. at 9). She then called for backup, and shortly thereafter several police vehicles 
arrived. (Aplt. Brf. at 9-10). The testimony of various officers indicated that both of the 
Gedos had separately and in different directions left the property. (Aplt. Brf. at 9). 
Officer Webber testified he later found Miguel walking south on the Provo 
River trail. (T.0262:10 at 1-2). Officer Webber further testified that Miguel, with his 
hands in his pockets, was walking towards Officer Webber, when Officer Webber 
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ordered Miguel to stop and get down on the ground, but Miguel refused. (T.0262:10 at 2-
4). Due to "several threats over the years to [Officer Webber] personally and to police 
officers in general" and due to the assault on [Cadet Trotter] and on two vehicles, Officer 
Webber "was concerned for [his] safety and the safety of those who lived in the apartment 
complex [Miguel] was supposed to be in." (T.262:9 at 2-4, 8-9, 18-24). Thus, when 
Miguel failed to respond to Officer Webber's order to stop and get down on the ground, 
Officer Webber drew his weapon. (T.262:10 at 4). Officer Webber testified that Miguel 
was about 150 or 200 feet away when Officer Webber ordered Miguel to get down on the 
ground, and that Miguel "definitely heard it." (T.262:12 at 16-22). When these events 
took place, Officer Webber was dressed in a police uniform, (T.262:12 at 23-25), and had 
just arrived in a police car. (T.262:13 at 3-4). 
When Officer Webber told Miguel a second time to get down, Miguel 
continued walking towards Officer Webber and "told [Officer Webber] on two occasions 
to go ahead and shoot him." (T.262:14 at 8-11). As Miguel continued to walk towards 
Officer Webber and as Officer Webber continued to tell Miguel to stop and get down on 
the ground, "Officer Billings ran up behind [Miguel] and tackled him, took him to the 
ground." (T.262:16 at 2-4). Officer Webber than holstered his weapon and assisted in 
handcuffing and taking Miguel into custody. (T.262:16 at 4-5). 
-11-
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The jury found Miguel guilty of violating Section 76-9-102(l)(b), (3), Utah 
Code Annotated, Disorderly Conduct, an infraction; Section 76-8-305, Utah Code 
Annotated, Interference with Arresting Officer, a Class B misdemeanor; and Section 41-
6-45(2003), Reckless Driving, a Class B misdemeanor. Miguel challenges the verdict and 
appeals for dismissal of the charge. 
The trial court did not err when it denied Miguel's Motion to 
Dismiss/Suppress. While the law in Utah regarding a warrantless search for a vehicle 
identification number (VIN) is unclear, the search, even if unlawful, did not result in any 
incriminating evidence that was used at trial, nor did it cause Miguel's unlawful actions. 
The seizure of the vehicle was authorized by the Provo City Code and was lawful under 
both the Provo City Code and the Utah Code. Utah law clearly disallows a "defense of 
property" defense against a police officer in the course of her duty. Finally, Miguel failed 
to show that Provo City failed to prosecute similarly situated persons and that Provo City 
discriminated against Miguel because of his race. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DENIED THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS/SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE VEHICLE 
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER WAS IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUES 
OF THE CASE, PROVO CITY'S ORDINANCE PROPERLY 
AUTHORIZED THE TOWING OF MIGUEL GEDOS' VEHICLE, AND 
THE TAINT OF ANY ILLEGALITY WAS REMOVED BY MIGUEL 
GEDO'S SUBSEQUENT ILLEGAL ACTIONS. 
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A. The Search of the VIN did not result in any incriminating evidence used 
at trial. 
The Fourth Amendment protects "the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." Bd. of 
Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002). Although the language of Article I, Section 14 
of the Utah Constitution follows the Fourth Amendment almost precisely, the Utah 
Supreme Court has been willing "to adopt more protective standards under the state 
Constitution" under the right circumstances." State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 466 (Utah 
1990) (plurality). While a warrantless search for a VIN is clearly legal under the Fourth 
Amendment, N. Y. v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 119 (1986), it is not so clear in the state of 
Utah. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (plurality rejects Class and requires exigent circumstances 
for VIN search); State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, n5 (Utah 1996) (plurality rejects 
Larocco as "not the law of this state"); State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 536 (Utah 1994) 
(Associate Chief Justice Stewart, concurring, expressly states that his concurrence in 
Larocco did not "indicate acceptance of the constitutional theory asserted therein."); State 
v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^ }31, 103 P.3d 699 (unanimous opinion rejects Class and cites 
Larocco approvingly once). 
Regardless of the legality of the VIN search here, however, Miguel has failed 
to show any evidence improperly obtained that was used at trial. Rather than simply 
denying the portion of Miguel's motion to suppress regarding the VIN, Judge McVey 
expressly reserved that issue in case "it turn[ed] out that the VIN [was] critical to the 
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prosecution in the future." (T.0261:71 at 7-9). At the Motion to Suppress hearing, rather 
than arguing that the VIN was evidence of wrongdoing, Miguel's counsel argued that the 
VIN was evidence in mitigation, showing that Miguel's vehicle did not have four unpaid 
parking tickets. (T.0261:53 at 10-17). Miguel's brief merely argues that the VIN search 
"may have led to further cause for impoundment," (Aplt. Brf. at 18) (emphasis added), 
not that it actually resulted in any incriminating evidence. The VIN information was 
irrelevant to the charges filed against Miguel. Thus, Judge McVey had no reason to 
suppress the VIN either at that point or later. Along the same lines, Miguel has failed to 
show "a reasonable likelihood that the [purported] error affected the outcome in the trial 
court." See State v. Verde, 110 P.2d 116, 120-21 (Utah 1989). 
B. Provo City Code § 9.17.080(4) authorized towing under these facts; Utah 
Code allows local ordinances, like Section 9.17.080(4), that are consistent 
with the Utah Code. 
The Utah Code authorizes municipalities "to regulate the movement of traffic 
on the streets, sidewalks and public places." Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-30. More 
specifically, the Utah Code authorizes "[l]ocal authorities [to] adopt ordinances consistent 
with [Title 41, Chapter 6), and additional traffic ordinances which are not in conflict with 
this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16 (2003); currently § 41-6a-207. Pursuant, in part 
at least, to this authority, Provo City enacted Section 9.17.080(4), which authorizes the 
towing of "[a]ny motor vehicle with respect to which four (4) or more Notices of 
Infraction are in default." Because the vehicle later claimed by the Gedos had four or 
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more defaulted parking tickets, Cadet Trotter had authority under a Provo City ordinance, 
which was allowed under the Utah Code, to tow the Gedos' vehicle. 
Miguel's brief essentially makes two arguments in support of the claim that the 
towing was improper: 1) the Utah Code did not specifically authorize towing under these 
circumstances and 2) neither Miguel nor James was cited for any violation which allowed 
towing. The previous paragraph adequately shows why the first argument fails: the Provo 
City Code authorized the tow, and the Utah Code allows for such city ordinances. This 
conclusion is supported by the language of Utah Code Ann. §§41-1 a-1101 and 41-6-
102(2003), currently § 41-6a-1405, which both specify different situations when an 
officer "may" tow a vehicle without limiting language regarding when an officer may not 
tow a vehicle. 
As to the second argument, neither the Utah Code nor the Provo City Code 
requires an arrest or citation before a vehicle may be towed. In fact, Utah Code Ann. § 
41-1 a-1101(2003) makes no mention of requiring a citation, and it specifically authorizes 
the towing of an abandoned vehicle, which would not involve a citation at all. More 
precisely, Provo City Code § 9.17.080(4) allows an officer to tow a vehicle with four 
long-unpaid parking tickets but it makes no mention of a requirement that the officer cite 
the owner or possessor of the vehicle. While an arrest may authorize the impoundment of 
a vehicle, see State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 275-76 (1968), the law clearly does not 
require it. 
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C. The taint of any allegedly illegal search or seizure was removed by Miguel 
Gedo's subsequent illegal actions. 
When evidence is obtained by or because of unconstitutional conduct by State 
agents, the typical remedy is to exclude the evidence illegally obtained. See State v. 
Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995). However, "an individual's response to 
police misconduct, such as fleeing or attacking an officer, can . . . intervene to break the 
connection between police lawlessness and later-discovered evidence." Id. at 295. Even 
following illegal activities by the police, "[w]here the defendant's response itself is a 
new, distinct, crime," evidence of that crime is admissible. Wagstaff, 846 P.2d at 1313. 
In the current case, even if the officers' conduct was illegal, Miguel's conduct 
clearly constituted new crimes. The facts in Wagstaff illustrate this point. In Wagstaff, 
officers found a plastic bag apparently containing marijuana. Id. at 1311. After the 
officer placed the bag on a nearby table, Wagstaff grabbed the bag, put it into his mouth 
and began to chew it. Id. at 1311-12. For purposes of the motion to suppress, the State 
stipulated that the initial seizure of the property was illegal. Id. This Court determined 
that regardless of the legality of the underlying seizure, "Wagstaff s actions following the 
seizure of his property supported a separate and distinct charge." Id. at 1312-13. Thus, 
even if Miguel is correct that the search of the VIN and the seizure of his vehicle were 
unlawful, the trial court did not err in allowing the charges filed to go forward as those 
charges only involved Miguel's illegal actions subsequent to the search and seizure. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT RULED THAT 
MIGUEL GEDO WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN USING FORCE TO 
DEFEND HIS PROPERTY BECAUSE USING FORCE IN DEFENSE 
OF PROPERTY IS NOT AUTHORIZED AGAINST AN OFFICER 
ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF AUTHORITY OF A PEACE 
OFFICER. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-406 justifies "using force, other than deadly force, 
against another when and to the extent necessary to prevent or terminate criminal 
interference with real or personal property: (1) lawfully in his possession." However, the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that in Utah there is no "common law right to resist an 
illegal search or arrest." Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574. "If such a defense exists in Utah, it 
must be grounded in the specific code sections under which [the defendant] was 
convicted." Id. Analyzing Section 76-2-406 specifically, the Court in Gardiner 
determined that "the actions of law enforcement officers taken within the course of their 
duties are not within the category of intrusions that may be lawfully resisted." Id. at 576. 
Whether an action is in the course of an officer's duty is "whether an officer is doing 
what he or she was employed to do or is 'engaging in a personal frolic of his [or her] 
own.'" Id. at 574 (change in original). 
In this case, Miguel's charges involved both peace officers as well as a parking 
cadet, a civilian officer hired under Provo City Code to enforce civil ordinances only. 
The charge of Interfering with Arresting Officer under Section 76-8-305 clearly arose 
from an actual peace officer's attempt to detain or arrest Miguel, so the holding in 
Gardiner is clearly on point. The other two convictions come from charges that appear to 
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have arisen from interactions with Cadet Trotter and reactions to her activities as a 
parking cadet. 
While Gardiner only covers peace officers specifically, the same reasoning 
applies with equal force to a cadet or other person acting under state authority with 
sufficient indicia to indicate she is acting under state authority. As noted in Gardiner, 
"[t]he societal interest in the orderly settlement of disputes between citizens and their 
government outweighs any individual interest in resisting a questionable search. One can 
reasonably be asked to submit peaceably and to take recourse in his legal remedies." Id, 
at 572 (emphasis added). As noted by Judge McVey below, "[t]here w[ere] peaceable 
means that w[ere] provided by the city affording [the Gedos] due process which . . . they 
could go through without disturbing the peace or breaching the peace." (T.0261:70 at 21-
24). In addition, to the same extent it is true against peace officers, "[s]elf-help measures 
undertaken by a potential defendant who objects to the legality of the search can lead to 
violence and serious physical injury." Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 572. Finally, whether the 
search is done by a civilian government agent or a peace officer, "in cases of illegal 
searches, the subject of the search has 'the assurance that any evidence so acquired is 
rendered inadmissible in a subsequent criminal trial.'" Id. 
Thus, under the reasoning of Gardiner, Miguel was not justified in the use of 
force against a peace officer or a government employee showing the indicia of 
government authority. The vehicle Cade Trotter was using at the time was clearly labeled 
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as a police vehicle, (see R. at 0003, 0061,0096, 0100, and T.0216:4 at 19-20) (all 
indicating police vehicle owned by Provo City), and Miguel has made no assertion that he 
did not know that she was acting under authority of law. Since Miguel was not justified 
in the use of force against the peace officers or Cadet Trotter, the trial court correctly 
determined that Miguel should have simply relied on the provided proper and legal means 
to protect his property rather than resorting to force. 
In addition to the inapplicability, generally, of the justified force statute to 
resisting peace officer actions, the statute also only applies when there is "criminal 
interference" with property. As noted previously, Cadet Trotter had authority under the 
Provo City Code, which was in accordance with the Utah Code, to tow the vehicle. When 
a person has legal authority to interfere with property, it is clearly not "criminal 
interference" with property. 
Finally, where peaceable means are available, using force is no longer 
"necessary to prevent or terminate criminal interference with real or personal property." 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-406. Judge McVey noted that Provo City had afforded 
Miguel due process by providing "peaceable means . . . which they could go through 
without disturbing the peace or breaching the peace." (T.0261:70 at 21-24). Gardiner 
also noted that under the current system, where legal remedies are available and the long-
term risk to a defendant is less pronounced, the reasons for the common law right to resist 
an unlawful arrest or search no longer applied with such force. 814 P.2d at 571-72. Here, 
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Miguel had lawful, non-forceful means to assert and protect his rights, so breaking the 
law was not necessary. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT FOUND NO PRIMA 
FACIE SHOWING OF SELECTIVE PROSECUTION BECAUSE 
MIGUEL GEDO FAILED TO PROVE UNEQUAL TREATMENT 
BASED ON A SUSPECT CLASS, OR, IN OTHER WORDS, THAT THE 
PROSECUTOR FAILED TO PROSECUTE SIMILARLY SITUATED 
PERSONS THAT WERE NOT MEMBERS OF THE SUSPECT CLASS. 
"Prosecutors are given broad discretion in determining whether to prosecute." 
State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Wayte v. U.S., 470 U.S. 598, 607 
(1985)). "As long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that an offense has 
been committed, the decision whether to prosecute "generally rests entirely in [the 
prosecutor's] discretion. Id. (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)) 
(change in original). However, "the decision to prosecute may not be "deliberately based 
upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Id. 
(citing Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608). "[Selective prosecution claims are assessed according to 
'ordinary equal protection standards.'" Id. 
A prima facie case under an equal protection claim consists of "identifying the 
group to which the defendant belonged and demonstrating that the identified group was 
treated disparately under the laws as written or applied." Id. For a selective prosecution 
claim, "the defendant must demonstrate that a prosecutorial policy results in a 
discriminatory effect, based on an unlawful classification. Id. (citing Wayte, 470 U.S. at 
608). The United States Supreme Court has stated that "the claimant must demonstrate 
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that the . . . prosecutorial policy had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a 
discriminatory purpose." U.S. v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996). "To establish a 
discriminatory effect in a race case, the claimant must show that similarly situated 
individuals of a different race were not prosecuted." Id.3 
In this case, Miguel has made no attempt to identify similarly situated 
individuals of a different race that were not prosecuted. Although Miguel has shown that 
he belongs to a suspect class, he has failed to show even one other person that was not 
prosecuted despite acting in a manner similar to Miguel's actions in this case. Instead, 
Miguel has focused on the numerous charges against and police incidents involving 
Miguel and James. (See T.0261:61-62 at 10-25, 1-16; Aplt. Brf. at 11-13). There are 
four main problems with this approach: 1) many of the listed charges did not involve 
3
 Miguel's brief as well as some cases fail to distinguish between selective 
prosecution and selective enforcement. (See Aplt. Brf. at 24 ("repeated criminal charges 
by the police," emphasis added)). They also fail to distinguish between the standard for a 
prima facie case of selective prosecution and the showing required for a defendant to be 
entitled to discovery on a selective prosecution claim. (See Aplt. Brf. at 27 (citing "some 
evidence" requirement "[t]o obtain discovery on this claim," emphasis added). However, 
a selective prosecution claim and a selective enforcement claim are not sufficiently 
different to require discussion for the purposes of this appeal. See U.S. v. Alcarez-
Arellano, 2006 US App. LEXIS 7797, No. 04-3230, 26-27 (after describing elements for 
selective prosecution claim, stating, "The elements are essentially the same for a 
selective-enforcement claim."). Like a prima facie case of selective prosecution, before a 
defendant will be entitled to discovery on a selective prosecution claim, he must "produce 
some evidence that similarly situated defendants of other races could have been 
prosecuted, but were not." Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 469. Because, as noted below, Miguel 
fails to present any evidence of similarly situated persons of other races that were not 
prosecuted, he cannot reach this apparently lower discovery standard nor the prima facie 
case standard. 
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Provo City nor Provo City Prosecutors, (T.0261:71 at 12-14; see Aplt. Brf. at 11-12), 2) 
two of the three cases involving Provo City charges were dismissed "when police 
witnesses] fail[ed] to appear at trial," (T.0261:71 at 14-17; Aplt. Brf. at 12), 3) the list 
failed to show charges for which the Gedos had been convicted, (T.0261:71 at 18-20; see 
Aplt. Brf. at 13-14), and 4) there was no showing that Provo City had failed to prosecute 
even one person of a different race who committed the same or a similar crime. 
Miguel's conspiracy theory that all of Utah is prejudiced against him lacks 
evidentiary support. As Judge McVey noted, "unless there's some evidence that Provo 
City is in union with the other cities and there's some type of conspiracy there I think you 
have to look mostly at what Provo City did." (T.0261:71 at 20-23). Without evidence of 
such a conspiracy, the number of charges in and outside of Provo City indicate Miguel's 
propensity to break the law more than a State-wide conspiracy against him. 
The fact that two officers failed to appear as witnesses for trial also does not 
indicate discrimination against Miguel because of his race. An officer might fail to 
appear as a witness for trial for many reasons other than racial discrimination, (see 
T.0261:71 at 16-17 (indicating that one officer had joined the FBI)). As with this case, 
Miguel has failed to provide any evidence that the officers in those cases did anything due 
to racial animus. Judge McVey also noted that Miguel had been convicted a time or two 
on Provo City charges. (T.0261:71 at 18-20). 
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Finally, these raw and incomplete numbers fail to show that similarly situated 
persons of other races were not charged. As the United States Supreme Court noted, "raw 
statistics regarding overall charges say nothing about charges brought against similarly 
situated defendants." U.S. v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862, 864 (2002). In regards to the current 
case as well as the previous ones, Miguel has failed to indicate even one similarly situated 
person of another race that was not prosecuted by Provo City. 
Miguel has also failed to present adequate evidence of discriminatory intent. 
The only evidence presented by Miguel and his counsel consisted of testimony by Miguel 
and James and statements by Miguel's counsel. (See Aplt. Brf. at 12-13, 24-25, 27; 
T.0261:61, 76 at 5-9, 11-21). Unsubstantiated statements by the Gedos and their counsel 
are simply "insufficient to overcome the presumption that the prosecutor acted without 
bias." See State v. Wallace, 2005 UT App 306, \l (unpublished, attached as addendum) 
(indicating that "Defendant's self-serving affidavits are insufficient to overcome the 
presumption"). Absent any showing of discriminatory intent by the police or the 
prosecutor, Judge McVey did not err in "not find[ing] any selective prosecution on the 
basis of racial category." (See T.0261:79 at 15-16). 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Provo City asks this Court to affirm the trial court's 
verdict finding Miguel guilty of Disorderly Conduct, Interference with Arresting Officer, 
and Reckless Driving. 
DATED this 
st-
day of May, 2006. 
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ADDENDUM 
STATE STATUES 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-30 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-l 101 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16 (2003) 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-102 (2003) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-406 
PROVO CITY ORDINANCES 
Provo City Code § 9.17.080(4) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
UNREPORTED CASES 
State v. Wallace, 2005 UT App 306 
-25-
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-30 Traffic Regulations 
They may regulate the movement of traffic on the streets, sidewalks and public 
places, including the movement of pedestrians as well as of vehicles, and the cars and 
engines of railroads, street railroads and tramways, and may prevent racing and 
immoderate driving or riding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1101 (2003) Seizure — Circumstances where permitted — 
Impound lot standards 
(1) The division or any peace officer, without a warrant, may seize and take 
possession of any vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor: 
(a) that the division or the peace officer has reason to believe has been stolen; 
(b) on which any identification number has been defaced, altered, or obliterated; 
(c) that has been abandoned on the public highways; 
(d) for which the applicant has written a check for registration or title fees that has 
not been honored by the applicant's bank and that is not paid within 30 days; 
(e) that is placed on the water with improper registration; or 
(f) that is being operated on a highway: 
(i) with registration that has been expired for more than three months; 
(ii) having never been properly registered by the current owner; or 
(iii) with registration that is suspended or revoked. 
(2) If necessary for the transportation of a seized vessel, the vessel's trailer may be 
seized to transport and store the vessel. 
(3) Any peace officer seizing or taking possession of a vehicle, vessel, or outboard 
motor under this section shall comply with the provisions of Section 41-6-102.5. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16 (2003) Uniform Application of Chapter - Effect of Local 
Ordinances 
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and uniform throughout this state and 
in all of its political subdivisions and municipalities. A local authority may not enact or 
enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions of this chapter. Local 
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authorities may, however, adopt ordinances consistent with this chapter, and additional 
traffic ordinances which are not in conflict with this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-102 (2003) Peace Officer Authorized to Move Vehicle 
(1) If a peace officer finds a vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-101, the officer may 
move the vehicle, cause the vehicle to be moved, or require the driver or other person 
responsible for the vehicle to move the vehicle to a safe position off the highway. 
(2) A peace officer may remove or cause to be removed to a place of safety any 
unattended vehicle left standing upon any highway in violation of this article or in a 
position or under circumstances that the vehicle obstructs the normal movement of traffic. 
(3) In accordance with Section 41-6-102.5, a peace officer may remove or cause to be 
removed to the nearest garage or other place of safety any vehicle found upon a highway 
when: 
(a) the vehicle has been reported stolen or taken without the consent of its owner; 
(b) the person responsible for the vehicle is unable to provide for its custody or 
removal; or 
(c) the person operating the vehicle is arrested for an alleged offense for which the 
peace officer is required by law to take the person arrested before a proper magistrate 
without unnecessary delay. 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-2-406 Force in Defense of Property 
A person is justified in using force, other than deadly force, against another when 
and to the extent that he reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent or 
terminate criminal interference with real property or personal property: 
(1) lawfully in his possession; or 
(2) lawfully in the possession of a member of his immediate family; or 
(3) belonging to a person whose property he has a legal duty to protect. 
PROVO CITY ORDINANCES 
Provo City Code § 9.17.080(4) 
Any motor vehicle with respect to which four (4) or more Notices of Infraction are 
in default is hereby declared to be a public nuisance and Provo City may authorize said 
motor vehicle to be towed from the public streets at the expense and risk of the registered 
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owner. Said motor vehicle shall be held and not released until the unpaid fees, and 
reasonable costs of towing and storage have been paid. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probably cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Orrin Bruce Wallace, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20040237-CA 
F I L E D 
( J u n e 3 0 , 2005) 
I 2 0 0 5 UT App 306 I 
Fifth District, St. George Department, 031500641 
The Honorable G. Rand Beacham 
Attorneys: Margaret P. Lindsay, Orem, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant Orrin Bruce Wallace appeals his conviction of assault 
by a prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
section 76-5-102.5. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (2003). We 
affirm. 
Defendant argues his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to 
file or pursue Defendant's claim that the State was selectively 
prosecuting him on the basis of his race. 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, "'a 
defendant must show (1) that counsel's performance was so 
deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of the trial would have been different.'" 
Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31,1(20, 94 P.3d 211 (quoting Wickham v. 
Galetka, 2002 UT 72,fl9, 61 P.3d 978) (additional citation omitted); 
see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). "In 
making this evaluation, the court must 'indulge in the strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance; that is the defendant must 
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Myers, 
2004 UT 31 at f20 (quoting State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 
1990)) (additional quotations and citations omitted). 
First, the performance of Defendant's trial counsel was not 
"below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. For instance, 
Defendant's trial counsel apparently advised Defendant that his 
selective-prosecution claim did not square with her trial strategy. 
Counsel's failure to raise a claim may be presumptively sound trial 
strategy. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993) (noting 
an act that "might be considered sound trial strategy" does not 
demonstrate inadequacy of counsel) ; see also Myers, 2 004 UT 31 at [^2 0 
(presuming trial counsel's action was "sound trial 
strategy" (quotations and citations omitted)). In addition, 
Defendant's pro se motion explicitly stated that he was pursuing the 
selective-prosecution action "without the assistance of counsel." 
Moreover, Defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's 
failure to pursue the selective-prosecution claim. Indeed, the trial 
court, affording procedural leniency to Defendant, allowed Defendant 
to file his first motion and affidavit at the conclusion of his 
trial, notwithstanding the State's objection. Nonetheless, the trial 
court chose not to rule on either of Defendant's motions. Further, 
the trial court did not err by not considering Defendant's motions or 
allowing Defendant further discovery because, as presented, those 
motions were insufficient. 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has opined on the heavy 
burden of such a claim: 
A selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits 
to the criminal charge itself, but an independent assertion 
that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons 
forbidden by the Constitution. Our cases delineating the 
necessary elements to prove a claim of selective prosecution 
have taken great pains to explain that the standard is a 
•t \ -r-«k 1 . \<""»i . t\ / r\ r\ r\ / /% A T T T 11 1 r it ir\r\r\s-
demanding one. These cases afford a background presumption 
that the showing necessary to obtain discovery should itself 
be a significant barrier to the litigation of insubstantial 
claims. 
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-64 (1996) (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). 
This court also addressed selective-prosecution claims in State 
v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Geer, we noted, 
"Prosecutors are given broad discretion in determining whether to 
prosecute." Id. at 3 (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 
607 (1985)). "As long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe 
that an offense has been committed, the decision regarding whether to 
prosecute 'generally rests entirely in [the prosecutor's] 
discretion.1" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bordenkircher v. 
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)). "Although selective prosecution 
claims are assessed according to 'ordinary equal protection 
standards,' the decision to prosecute may not be 'deliberately based 
upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other 
arbitrary classification.'" Id. (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608). As 
here, "a defendant who seeks discovery on a claim of selective 
prosecution must show some evidence of both discriminatory effect and 
discriminatory intent." United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862, 863 
(2 002). To show discriminatory effect, "the defendant must make a 
'credible showing' that 'similarly situated individuals of a 
different race were not prosecuted.'" Id. (quoting Armstrong, 517 
U.S. at 465, 470). 
Here, Defendant's only evidence of the prosecutor's alleged 
deliberate racial bias consisted of his two affidavits, the first of 
which did not identify the race of Defendant's example of a similarly 
situated inmate. In light of the small sample size--two other 
inmates--and self-serving nature of Defendant's affidavits, the trial 
court did not find Defendant's evidence credible. Indeed, Defendant's 
self-serving affidavits are insufficient to overcome the presumption 
that the prosecutor acted without bias. See United States v. Peete, 
919 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir. 1990) (upholding district court's 
conclusion that the defendant's self-serving affidavit and an 
affidavit from his counsel did not support his selective-prosecution 
claim); cf. State v. Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95,fl0, 68 P.3d 1035 
(ruling a self-serving "affidavit, by itself, is insufficient to 
invalidate a prior conviction"). 
Because we determine that Defendant's selective-prosecution claim 
is without merit, Defendant's trial counsel's failure to pursue it 
did not prejudice Defendant. See State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41,1(26, 1 
P.3d 546 ("Failure to raise futile objections does not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel."); see also Truesdale v. Moore, 
142 F.3d 749, 755 (4th Cir. 1998) ("It was not constitutionally 
ineffective assistance for [the defendant's] resentencing counsel not 
to pursue futile claims."). Under such a conclusion, Defendant's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. Actually, Defendant's accusations are better characterized as 
selective plea bargaining. According to Defendant's affidavits, both 
of the fellow inmates to whom Defendant compared himself were 
prosecuted, but were offered plea deals by the State. 
